FROM THE PUBLISHER

In Kinds of Minds, Dennett asks the ultimate metaphysical questions: What is a mind and who else (besides the questioner) has one? Combining ideas from philosophy, artificial intelligence, and neurobiology, Dennett leads the reader on a fascinating journey of inquiry, exploring such intriguing possibilities as: Can any of us really know what is going on in someone else's mind? What distinguishes the human mind from the minds of animals, especially those capable of complex behavior? If such animals, for instance, were magically given the power of language, would their communities evolve an intelligence as subtly discriminating as ours? Would they be capable of developing the uniquely human ability to theorize about the world they inhabit? Will robots, once they have been endowed with sensory systems like those that provide us with experience, ever exhibit the particular traits long thought to distinguish the human mind, including the ability to think about thinking? Dennett address these questions from an evolutionary perspective. Beginning with the macromolecules of DNA and RNA, whose evolution was determined by Darwinian natural selection, Dennett shows how, step by step, animal life moved from a simple ability to respond to frequently recurring environmental conditions to much more powerful ways of beating the odds, ways of using patterns of past experience to predict the future in never-before-encountered situations. He argues that a series of small but revolutionary steps moved us from there to the unique human capability to frame and execute specific long-range intentions. These changes included first the emergence of speech, then, because of situations in which the ability to keep secrets conferred an evolutionary advantage, a skill in conversing with ourselves, and finally, the creation of artifacts that permit us to expand our minds into the surrounding environment.

FROM THE CRITICS

New Scientist

Thought-provoking, entertainingly written, and quite literally, mind-blowing.

Washington Post Book World

Dennett's graceful and witty exposition is unflinchingly rigorous.

Publishers Weekly

Dennett (Darwin's Dangerous Idea), director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, avers that language is the "slingshot" that has "launched [humans] far beyond all other earthly species in the power to look ahead and reflect." In this brief study, some of which is drawn from notes for the author's various lectures, and which returns him to some of the themes of his controversial bestseller, Consciousness Explained (1991), he explores how the human mind came into existence. Along the way, he investigates such questions as, How does the mind work? Can we know another's mind? Can a woman know what it's like to be a man (and vice versa)? What are nonhuman minds like? Could a robot ever be "conscious"? Philosopher that he is, Dennett continually raises and refines his questions about these and other subjects, attempting to tease us closer to understanding. By the end of the book, he confesses, he has not so much presented answers as found better questions to ask. Though some readers may be put off by Dennett's cocksure tone, others will be rewarded by his witty, intelligible speculation. (July)

Kirkus Reviews

Dennett wears his philosophical hat in this short volume, based on lectures given at University College, Dublin and Canterbury University (New Zealand). As a result, there is more intellectual gameplay here than late news from the neuroscience front, making for a volume that is sometimes stimulating, but often frustrating.

Dennett (Center for Cognitive Studies/Tufts Univ.) is a clever writer and has written insightfully about mind matters in Consciousness Explained (1991) and evolution in Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995). But in assuming the philosopher's stance here he admits to raising more questions than answers. At the same time he introduces into these lectures a welter of specialized languages and theories, including the vocabulary of ontology, epistemology, and a string of associated concepts, such as intentionality; the notion of an agent or doer or a "mind-haver"; physical and design stances; associationism, behaviorism, and connectionism (as in neural networks), referred to as ABC learning and so on. To what avail? Simply, it seems, to come to some conclusions about where in the Darwinian scheme of things thinking and consciousness (and self-consciousness) come into being. In the end, Dennett strongly supports the notion that only with language comes thought. Further, we only arrive in the abstract multidimensional world of ideas by means of written language and the ability to extend our intelligence through the artful inventions of culture and its representations in books, computers, and records (our external mental "prosthetic" devices). So nix on intelligent chimps and dolphins, but maybe a kind word for dogs as having been bred to respond to humans.

Not a book that will be embraced by animal champions. And not Dennett at his best.

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