Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire is an impeccably written analysis of the last months of the Pacific War and the unfolding of the American air campaign over Japan. The story opens with a searing description of the fire-bombing of Tokyo in March 1945, which caused more deaths than the atom bomb in Hiroshima. Within five months, Japan's economy was collapsing and the country faced catastrophic starvation. Richard B. Frank coolly analyzes different scenarios for ending the war (Russia waited in the wings). Frank concludes that the emperor and the Japanese military were far from ready to surrender, and that the decision to use the atom bomb probably saved millions of lives, not only Allied but Japanese and other Asian lives, also--perhaps a hundred thousand Chinese were dying each month under Japanese occupation. The effects of the bomb worked on many levels, even lending faces to the Japanese militarists, who could convince themselves that they were defeated not by a lack of spiritual power but by superior science. Densely documented, intelligently argued, Downfall recreates the end of the war from the viewpoints of the principals, giving the book an unusual immediacy. A highly valuable insight into the disintegration of the Japanese Empire, one of the most dramatic episodes of World War II. --John Stevenson


From Publishers Weekly
The premise behind this excellent history of the concluding stages of WWII in the Pacific is that the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has cast a light so bright that it has blinded historians to many of the political, diplomatic and military realities that existed before August 6, 1945. In his comprehensive study of the last months of WWII, Frank (Guadalcanal) aims to present events "as they were perceived and recorded by American and Japanese participants in 1945Anot years or decades thereafter." In 1945, American strategists developed their plan, "Operation Downfall," for forcing the unconditional surrender of Japan. Japanese leaders, meanwhile, mobilized all available military and civilian resources for a final defense of the homeland. Though they knew the war was lost, Japanese military strategists believed their preparations were sufficient to compel the Allies to offer more generous terms on which the war might end. Frank immerses his readers in the flow of intelligence estimates, battle experience and shifting strategy on both sides. The centerpiece of the book is an exacting and dispassionate examination both of the American decision to use the atomic bomb and of whether Japan would have surrendered absent the bomb. Frank marshals an impressive and complex array of evidence to support his contention that surrender by Japan was by no means imminent in August 1945, and that alternatives to the bomb, such as incendiary bombing, carried no certainty of causing less suffering and fewer deaths than the atomic bomb. In his balanced use of sources and in his tough-minded sensitivity to moral issues, Frank has enriched the debate about the war's conclusion. Agent, Robert Gottlieb of William Morris. Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.


From Library Journal
Few historical issues have generated as much controversy as the question of whether the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 was necessary to compel Japan's surrender. No single book can be expected to end such a heated debate, but Frank's masterly study of Japan's decision to surrender comes close to doing so. Based on extensive documentation from contemporary U.S. and Japanese diplomatic and military sources, it is the most authoritative treatment available of the end of the Pacific War. Frank (Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Campaign) emphasizes the enormous reluctance of Japan's military and civilian leaders even to consider, let alone accept, Allied demands for unconditional surrender prior to the atomic bombings. Skillfully weaving together the strands of military and diplomatic events, Frank contends that absent the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the war would have continued for at least several more months, at a cost in Japanese and Allied civilian and combatant lives far in excess of the admittedly awful toll that the atomic bombs exacted. A powerful work of history that belongs in all libraries.ASteven I. Levine, Univ. of Montana, Missoula Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.


The New York Times Book Review, J. Samuel Walker
...those who seek a well-informed, thoughtful and judicious account have good reason to applaud this book.


From Booklist
The closing months of the Pacific theater in World War II remain a subject of controversy among historians, particularly those with political agendas. At the core of this controversy, of course, is the decision to drop the bomb. Was it truly a military decision, designed to save American lives by making unnecessary an invasion of the Japanese home islands? Or was it, rather, a cynical effort to pressure our Soviet "ally" into diplomatic concessions in Europe? Frank, a Vietnam veteran and military historian, has done a masterful job of recounting the closing months of the war while avoiding the trap of historical hindsight. He strives mightily to re-create the perceptions of American and Japanese military planners, diplomats, and politicians during the cauldron of violence on a massive scale. He places the bomb within the proper overall context of the air campaigns against Japan, and he also stresses the often-neglected effectiveness of the American naval blockade. This is a brilliant, strongly argued, but scrupulously fair examination of these brutal, horrifying, but critical months. Jay Freeman


From Kirkus Reviews
Military historian Frank (Guadalcanal, 1990) constructs a detailed history of the last months of the US war with Japan using both Japanese and American sources. Frank insists that events of the time be understood as they were perceived then, by both sides, not as they are now interpreted and judged. Using this method, Frank arrives at three conclusions: the US considered the use of atomic weapons not as extraordinary events but as part of a larger strategy of blockade and bombardment; not until after the use of atomic weapons did the Japanese indicate they were willing to surrender; and the use of atomic weapons was justified. The moral dimension of US actions was conditioned by the war in Europe and also by what was known of Japanese intentions. Devastating strategic bombing had taken place in Germany and continued in Japan. In March of 1945, up to 100,000 people perished in the firebombing of Tokyo. The use of atomic weapons was the culmination of strategic thinking, not a departure from it. On the Japanese side, according to that nations sources as well as US intelligence reports, while offers of a negotiated settlement were floated, there was still strong support among top leaders, including the emperor, for ketsu-go, a last ditch effort to resist an invasion of the Japanese main islands. Thus, on the US side there was a general certainty that an invasion of Japan would create large numbers of US casualties. Frank discusses in great detail these and other themes, and his defense of the use of atomic weapons is convincing. Still, his contention that both sides would have readily accepted the bombing had they known it would have led to two generations of peace and prosperity is a violation of his own method of describing events as they were seen then, and so is a disingenuous defense that allows him to ignore deeper moral questions raised by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (maps, not seen) -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.


Review
Praise for Guadalcanal

"Brilliant . . . an enormous work based on the most meticulous research. Here is everything you might want to know about Guadalcanal."                
--Los Angeles Times Book Review

"Richard Frank has produced what will surely become the standard history of the U.S. Navy's most important campaign. . . . A stunning debut by a major new talent in American letters."  
--Tom Clancy

"Guadalcanal is a masterly account of what happened and why. . . . Books of this quality are rare, and Richard B. Frank should be commended for his authoritative  inaugural work."                                                                          
--Chicago Tribune

"Mr. Frank's book is impressive in virtually all respects--a vividly and carefully crafted monument that is worthy of the Americans and Japanese who collided . . . on a little-known island named Guadalcanal."
--The New York Times Book Review


Book Description
In a riveting narrative that includes information from newly declassified documents, acclaimed historian Richard B. Frank gives a scrupulously detailed explanation of the critical months leading up to the dropping of the atomic bomb. Frank explains how American leaders learned in the summer of 1945 that their alternate strategy to end the war by invasion had been shattered by the massive Japanese buildup on Kyushu, and that intercepted diplomatic documents also revealed the dismal prospects of negotiation. Here also, for the first time, is a comprehensive account of how Japan's leaders were willing to risk complete annihilation to preserve the nation's existing order. Frank's comprehensive account demolishes long-standing myths with the stark realities of this great historical controversy.

FROM THE PUBLISHER

These pages present the untold story of how American leaders learned in the summer of 1945 that their compromise strategy to end the war by blockade and bombardment, followed by invasion, had been shattered; radio intelligence had unmasked a massive Japanese buildup on Kyushu designed to turn the initial invasion into a bloody shambles. Meanwhile, the text and analysis of diplomatic intercepts depicted sterile prospects for negotiation before a final clash of arms. Here also, for the first time, is a full and balanced account of how Japan's leaders risked annihilation by gambling on a military strategy aimed at securing political bargaining leverage to preserve the old order in Japan.. "Downfall replaces the myths that now surround the end of the war and the use of the bomb with the stark realities of this great historical controversy.

FROM THE CRITICS

J. Samuel Walker - New York Times Book Review

...a carefully reasoned and admirably balanced account that should be required reading for anyone with an interest in the atomic bomb and the end of the war...a well-informed, thoughtful and judicious account...

Publishers Weekly

The premise behind this excellent history of the concluding stages of WWII in the Pacific is that the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has cast a light so bright that it has blinded historians to many of the political, diplomatic and military realities that existed before August 6, 1945. In his comprehensive study of the last months of WWII, Frank (Guadalcanal) aims to present events "as they were perceived and recorded by American and Japanese participants in 1945--not years or decades thereafter." In 1945, American strategists developed their plan, "Operation Downfall," for forcing the unconditional surrender of Japan. Japanese leaders, meanwhile, mobilized all available military and civilian resources for a final defense of the homeland. Though they knew the war was lost, Japanese military strategists believed their preparations were sufficient to compel the Allies to offer more generous terms on which the war might end. Frank immerses his readers in the flow of intelligence estimates, battle experience and shifting strategy on both sides. The centerpiece of the book is an exacting and dispassionate examination both of the American decision to use the atomic bomb and of whether Japan would have surrendered absent the bomb. Frank marshals an impressive and complex array of evidence to support his contention that surrender by Japan was by no means imminent in August 1945, and that alternatives to the bomb, such as incendiary bombing, carried no certainty of causing less suffering and fewer deaths than the atomic bomb. In his balanced use of sources and in his tough-minded sensitivity to moral issues, Frank has enriched the debate about the war's conclusion. Agent, Robert Gottlieb of William Morris. (Oct.) Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information.

Library Journal

Few historical issues have generated as much controversy as the question of whether the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 was necessary to compel Japan's surrender. No single book can be expected to end such a heated debate, but Frank's masterly study of Japan's decision to surrender comes close to doing so. Based on extensive documentation from contemporary U.S. and Japanese diplomatic and military sources, it is the most authoritative treatment available of the end of the Pacific War. Frank (Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Campaign) emphasizes the enormous reluctance of Japan's military and civilian leaders even to consider, let alone accept, Allied demands for unconditional surrender prior to the atomic bombings. Skillfully weaving together the strands of military and diplomatic events, Frank contends that absent the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the war would have continued for at least several more months, at a cost in Japanese and Allied civilian and combatant lives far in excess of the admittedly awful toll that the atomic bombs exacted. A powerful work of history that belongs in all libraries.--Steven I. Levine, Univ. of Montana, Missoula Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information.

William L. O'Neill

The publication of Richard Frank's long-awaited Downfall is an event of great importance, not only to historians, but to the general public. No aspect of World War II is more controversial today than the use of atomic bombs against Japan in 1945. Some have argued that this act was cruel and unnecessary since Japan was on the verge of surrender.

By Means of exhaustive research, and the employment of previously neglected and recently declassifed sources, Frank proves in this definitive book that neither the Emperor nor the Japanese armed forces were anywhere close to surrendering in August 1945. In a stunning tour de force, Frank recreates the end of the war, not as it seemed to people writing much later, but as it appeared to American and Japanese decision-makers at the time.

Often seen as the worst possible way of ending the Pacific War, Frank established that using the bomb was superior to all the existing alternatives, and saved not only allied but Japanese lives as well. Masterful in conception brilliantly reasoned, superbly researched, Downfall is all but impossible to put down. Anyone concerned with the moral, military, and political issues surrounding the end of the Pacific War must read this book.

Kirkus Reviews

Military historian Frank (Guadalcanal, 1990) constructs a detailed history of the last months of the US war with Japan using both Japanese and American sources. Frank insists that events of the time be understood as they were perceived then, by both sides, not as they are now interpreted and judged. Using this method, Frank arrives at three conclusions: the US considered the use of atomic weapons not as extraordinary events but as part of a larger strategy of blockade and bombardment; not until after the use of atomic weapons did the Japanese indicate they were willing to surrender; and the use of atomic weapons was justified. The moral dimension of US actions was conditioned by the war in Europe and also by what was known of Japanese intentions. Devastating strategic bombing had taken place in Germany and continued in Japan. In March of 1945, up to 100,000 people perished in the firebombing of Tokyo. The use of atomic weapons was the culmination of strategic thinking, not a departure from it. On the Japanese side, according to that nation's sources as well as US intelligence reports, while offers of a negotiated settlement were floated, there was still strong support among top leaders, including the emperor, for ketsu-go, a last ditch effort to resist an invasion of the Japanese main islands. Thus, on the US side there was a general certainty that an invasion of Japan would create large numbers of US casualties. Frank discusses in great detail these and other themes, and his defense of the use of atomic weapons is convincing. Still, his contention that both sides would have readily accepted the bombing had they known it would have led to two generations of peace and prosperity isa violation of his own method of describing events as they were seen then, and so is a disingenuous defense that allows him to ignore deeper moral questions raised by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (maps, not seen)